Malayan Emergency

OriginsSingapore issued an identical offer at the same
See also: Circumstances prior to the Malayantime. Tunku Abdul Rahman, as Chief Minister,
Emergencymade good the offer of an amnesty but
The withdrawal of Japan at the end of World Warpromised there would be no negotiations with the
II left the Malayan economy disrupted. ProblemsMNLA. The terms of the amnesty were:
included unemployment, low wages, and scarceThose of you who come in and surrender will not
and expensive food. There was considerablebe prosecuted for any offense connected with
labour unrest, and a large number of strikesthe Emergency, which you have committed under
occurred in 1946 through 1948. The BritishCommunist direction, either before this date or in
administration was attempting to repair Malaya'signorance of this declaration.
economy quickly, especially as revenue fromYou may surrender now and to whom you like
Malaya's tin and rubber industries was importantincluding to members of the public.
to Britain's own post-war recovery. As a result,There will be no general "ceasefire" but the
protesters were dealt with harshly, by measuressecurity forces will be on alert to help those who
including arrests and deportations. In turn,wish to accept this offer and for this purpose
protesters became increasingly militant. On 16local "ceasefire" will be arranged.
June, 1948, the first overt act of the war tookThe Government will conduct investigations on
place when three European plantation managersthose who surrender. Those who show that they
were killed at Sungai Siput, Perak.are genuinely intent to be loyal to the
The British brought emergency measures intoGovernment of Malaya and to give up their
law, first in Perak in response to the Sungai SiputCommunist activities will be helped to regain their
incident and then, in July, country-wide. Under thenormal position in society and be reunited with
measures, the MCP and other leftist parties weretheir families. As regards the remainder,
outlawed, and the police were given the power torestrictions will have to be placed on their liberty
imprison without trial communists and thosebut if any of them wish to go to China, their
suspected of assisting communists. The MCP, ledrequest will be given due consideration.
by Chin Peng, retreated to rural areas, andFollowing the declaration, an intensive publicity
formed the MNLA, also known as the Malayancampaign on a hitherto unprecedented scale was
Races Liberation Army (MRLA), or the Malayanlaunched by the Government. Alliance Ministers in
People's Liberation Army (MPLA). The MNLAthe Federal Government travelled extensively up
began a guerrilla campaign, targeting mainly theand down the country exhorting the people to call
colonial resource extraction industries, which inupon the Communists to lay down their arms and
Malaya were the tin mines and rubber plantations.take advantage of the amnesty. The response
The MNLA was partly a re-formation of thefrom the public was good. Public demonstrations
Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA),and processions were held in towns and villages.
the MCP-led guerrilla force which had been theDespite the campaign, few Communists
principal resistance in Malaya against the Japanesesurrendered to the authorities. It was evident that
occupation. The British had secretly trained andthe Communists, having had ample warning of its
armed the MPAJA during the later stages ofdeclaration, conducted intensive anti-amnesty
World War II. Disbanded in December, 1945, thepropaganda in their ranks and among the mass
MPAJA officially turned all of its weapons in to theorganizations, tightened discipline and warned that
British Military Administration. However, manydefection would be severely punished. Some
weapons were not returned, and were stashedcritics in the political circles commented that the
for possible future use.[citation needed]amnesty was too restrictive and little more than
Guerrilla wara restatement of the surrender terms which
Identification portrait of a "communist terrorist",have been in force for a long period. The critics
used by Commonwealth troops to help recogniseadvocated a more realistic and liberal approach of
insurgents.direct negotiations with the MCP to work out a
The MNLA commonly employed guerrilla tactics,settlement of the issue. Leading officials of the
sabotaging installations, attacking rubber plantationsLabour Party had, as part of the settlement, not
and destroying transportation and infrastructure.exclude the possibility of recognition of the MCP
Support for the MNLA was mainly based onas a political organization. Within the Alliance itself,
around 500,000 of the 3.12 million ethnic Chineseinfluential elements in both the MCA and UMNO
then living in Malaya. The ethnic Malay populationwere endeavouring to persuade the Chief Minister,
supported them in smaller numbers. The MNLATunku Abdul Rahman to hold negotiations with the
gained the support of the Chinese because theyMCP.
were denied the equal right to vote in elections,The Baling Talks
had no land rights to speak of, and were usuallyMain article: The Baling Talks
very poor. The MNLA's supply organisation wasRealizing that his conflict had not come to any
called "Min Yuen." It had a network of contactsfruition, Chin Peng sought a referendum with the
within the general population. Besides supplyingruling British government alongside many Malayan
material, especially food, it was also important toofficials in 1955. The talk took place in the
the MNLA as an information gatherer.Government English School at Baling on December
The MNLA's camps and hideouts were in the28. The MCP was represented by Chin Peng, the
rather inaccessible tropical jungle with limitedSecretary-General, Rashid Maidin and Chen Tien,
infrastructure. Most MNLA guerrillas were ethnichead of the MCP's Central Propaganda
Chinese, though there were some Malays,Department; on the other side were three
Indonesians and Indians among its members. Theelected national representatives, Tunku Abdul
MNLA was organized into regiments, althoughRahman, Dato's Tan Cheng-Lock and David Saul
these had no fixed establishments and eachMarshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore. The
encompassed all forces operating in a particularmeeting was intended to pursue a mutual end to
region. The regiments had political sections,the conflict but the Malayan government
commissars, instructors and secret service. In therepresentatives, led by Tunku Abdul Rahman,
camps, the soldiers attended lectures ondismissed all of Chin Peng's demands. As a result,
Marxism-Leninism, and produced politicalthe conflict heightened and, in response, New
newsletters to be distributed to the locals. TheZealand sent NZSAS soldiers, No. 14 Squadron
MNLA also stipulated that their soldiers neededRNZAF No.41(Bristol Freighter)Squadron and later
official permission for any romantic involvementNo. 75 Squadron RNZAF, and other
with local women.Commonwealth members also sent troops to aid
In the early stages of the conflict, the guerrillasthe British.
envisioned establishing "liberated areas" from whichFollowing the failure of the talks, Tunku decided to
the government forces had been driven, andwithdraw the amnesty on 8 February, 1956, five
MNLA control established. They weremonths after it had been offered, stating that he
unsuccessful, however, in establishing any suchwould not be willing to meet the Communists
areas.again unless they indicated beforehand their desire
British responseto see him with a view to making "a complete
The initial government strategy was primarily tosurrender". Despite the failure of the talks, the
guard important economic targets such as minesMCP made every effort to resume peace talks
and plantation estates. Subsequently, General Sirwith Malayan Government, without success.
Harold Briggs, the British Army's Director ofInstead, discussions began in the new Emergency
Operations in Malaya, developed an overallOperations Council to intensify the "People's War"
strategy known as the Briggs Plan. Its centralagainst the guerillas. In July 1957, a few weeks
tenet was that the best way to defeat anbefore Independence, the MCP made another
insurgency such as the government was facingattempt at peace talks, suggesting the following
was to cut the insurgents off from theirconditions for a negotiated peace:its members
supporters amongst the population.should be given privileges enjoyed by citizensa
The Briggs Plan was multi-faceted. However oneguarantee that political as well as armed members
aspect of it has become particularly well known:of the MCP would not be punished.
this was the forced relocation of some 500,000Tunku Abdul Rahman, however, did not respond
rural Malayans, including 400,000 Chinese, fromto the MCP's proposals.
squatter communities on the fringes of theWith the independence of Malaya under Prime
forests into guarded camps called New Villages.Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on 31 August, 1957,
These villages were newly constructed in mostthe insurrection lost its rationale as a war of
cases, and were surrounded by barbed wire,colonial liberation. The last serious resistance from
police posts and floodlit areas, the purpose ofMRLA guerrillas ended with a surrender in the
which was both to keep the inhabitants in and theTelok Anson marsh area in 1958. The remaining
guerrillas out. People resented this at first, butMRLA forces fled to the Thai border and further
some soon became content with the better livingeast.
standards in the villages. They were given moneyOn 31 July, 1960 the Malayan government
and ownership of the land they lived on.declared the state of emergency was over, and
Removing a population which might beChin Peng left south Thailand for Beijing where he
sympathetic to guerrillas was a counter-insurgencywas accommodated by the Chinese authorities in
technique which the British had used before,the International Liaison Bureau, where many
notably against the Boer Commandos in theother Southeast Asian Communist Party leaders
Second Boer War (18991902), although in Malaya,were housed.
the operation was more humanely and efficientlyDuring the conflict, security forces killed 6,710
conducted.MRLA guerrillas and captured 1,287. 2,702 guerrillas
In the international scene, the emerging Koreansurrendered during the conflict, while
War eclipsed the developing conflict in Malaya.approximately 500 more did so at the end of the
Jungle service dress of the 1st Battalion Somersetconflict. 1,345 Malayan troops and police were
Light Infantry used in the emergency.killed during the conflict, as well as 519
At the start of the Emergency, the British had aCommonwealth personnel. 2,478 civilians were
total of 13 infantry battalions in Malaya, includingkilled, with another 810 recorded as missing.
seven partly-formed Gurkha battalions, threeAustralian contribution
British battalions, two battalions of the RoyalAustralia was willing to send troops to help a
Malay Regiment and a British Royal ArtillerySEATO ally and the first Australian ground forces,
Regiment being utilised as infantry. This force wasthe 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
too small to effectively meet the threat of the(2RAR), arrived in 1955. The battalion was later be
"communist terrorists" or "bandits", and morereplaced by 3RAR, which in turn was replaced by
infantry battalions were needed in Malaya. The1RAR. The Royal Australian Air Force contributed
British brought in soldiers from units such as theNo. 1 Squadron (Avro Lincoln bombers) and No. 38
Royal Marines and King's African Rifles. AnotherSquadron (C-47 transports), operating out of
effort was a re-formation of the Special AirSingapore, early in the conflict. In 1955, the RAAF
Service in 1950 as a specialised reconnaissance,extended Butterworth air base, from which
raiding and counter-insurgency unit.Canberra bombers of No. 2 Squadron (replacing
The Permanent Secretary of Defence for Malaya,No. 1 Squadron) and CAC Sabres of No. 78 Wing
Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, had served incarried out ground attack missions against the
the Chindits in Burma during World War II. Hisguerillas. The Royal Australian Navy destroyers
vast experience in jungle warfare proved valuableWarramunga and Arunta joined the force in June
during this period as he was able to build effective1955. Between 1956 and 1960, the aircraft
civil-military relations and was one of the chiefcarriers Melbourne and Sydney and destroyers
architects of the counter-insurgency plan inAnzac, Quadrant, Queenborough, Quiberon,
Malaya.Quickmatch, Tobruk, Vampire, Vendetta and
In 1951, some British army units began a "heartsVoyager were attached to the Commonwealth
and minds campaign" by giving medical and foodStrategic Reserve forces for three to nine
aid to Malays and indigenous tribes. At the samemonths at a time. Several of the destroyers fired
time, they put pressure on MNLA by patrolling theon Communist positions in Johor State.
jungle. The MNLA guerrillas were driven deeperComparisons with Vietnam
into the jungle and denied resources. The MRLAThe conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam have been
extorted food from the Sakai and earned theircompared many times and it has been asked by
enmity. Many of the captured guerrillas changedhistorians how a British force of 35,000
sides. In comparison, the MRLA never releasedsucceeded where over half a million U.S. soldiers
any Britons alive.failed in a smaller area. However the two conflicts
In the end the conflict involved a maximum ofdiffer in several key points.
40,000 British and Commonwealth troops againstThe MNLA was isolated and without external
a peak of about 78,000 communist guerrillas.supporters.[citation needed]
British propaganda during the EmergencyThe MNLA was politically isolated from the bulk of
British propaganda was distributed by thethe population. It was, as mentioned above, a
Psychological Warfare Section of the Emergencypolitical movement almost entirely limited to ethnic
Information Service (EIS). The Chinese AssistantChinese; support among Muslim Malays and smaller
to the Head of the Service was C. C. Too, whotribes was scattered if existent at all. Malay
became head of the Psychological Warfarenationalists supported the British because they
Section in 1955. He believed that it was morepromised independence in a Malay state; an MNLA
important to propagandize the civilians, rather thanvictory would imply a state dominated by ethnic
the insurgents, as the insurgents listened to theChinese, and possibly a puppet state of Beijing or
masses.Moscow.
The Psychological Warfare Section producedBritain never approached the Emergency as a
about six million leaflets each month, which wereconventional conflict and quickly implemented an
packed into bundles of 2,500 each at the Kualaeffective combined intelligence (led by Malayan
Lumpur Royal Air Force Station. The majority ofPolice Special Branch against the political arm of
the leaflets were developed in light yellow sand orthe guerrilla movement) and a "hearts and minds"
deep brown earth colors to blend in with theoperation.
ground, in order to enable comrades to stealMany Malayans had fought side by side with the
glances at them, without fear of undueBritish against the Japanese occupation in World
attentionne of Too's novel ideas.War II, including Chin Peng. This is in contrast to
In addition to leaflets, aircraft equipped withIndochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) where
loudspeakers broadcast propaganda over remoteFrench colonial officials often operated as proxies
areas.and collaborators to the Japanese. This factor of
Control of anti-guerrilla operationstrust between the locals and the colonials was
At all levels of government (national, state, andwhat gave the British an advantage over the
district levels), the military and civil authority wasFrench and later, the Americans in Vietnam.
assumed by a committee of military, police andIn purely military terms, the British Army
civilian administration officials. This allowedrecognized that in a low-intensity war, the
intelligence from all sources to be rapidly evaluatedindividual soldier's skill and endurance was of far
and disseminated, and also allowed all anti-guerrillagreater importance than overwhelming firepower
measures to be coordinated. Each State War(artillery, air support, etc.) Even though many
Executive Committee, for example, included theBritish soldiers were conscripted National
State Chief Minister as chair, the Chief PoliceServicemen, the necessary skills and attitudes
Officer, the senior military commander, statewere taught at a Jungle Warfare School, which
home guard officer, state financial officer, statealso worked out the optimum tactics based on
information officer, executive secretary and up toexperience gained in the field.
six selected community leaders. The Police, MilitaryLegacy
and Home Guard representatives and theThe National Monument commemorating those
Secretary formed the operations sub-committeewho died in Malaysia's struggle for freedom,
responsible for day-to-day direction of emergencyincluding the Malayan Emergency
operations. The operations subcommittees as aThe Indonesiaalaysia confrontation of 19621966
whole made joint decisions.arose from tensions between Indonesia and the
Nature of warfarenew British backed Federation of Malaysia which
The British Army soon realised that clumsywas conceived in the aftermath of the Malayan
sweeps by large formations were unproductive.Emergency.
Instead, platoons or sections carried out patrolsIn the late 1960s the coverage of the My Lai
and laid ambushes, based on intelligence (frommassacre during the Vietnam War prompted the
informers, surrendered MNLA personnel, aerialinitiation of investigations in the UK concerning
reconnaissance etc.) A typical operation wasalleged war crimes perpetrated by British forces
"Nassau", carried out in the Kuala Langat swamp:during the Emergency. One of such allegations is
After several assassinations, a British battalionthe Batang Kali massacre. However, no charges
was assigned to the area. Food control wasagainst the British forces were ever proven and
achieved through a system of rationing, convoys,were dismissed as vicious propaganda by the
gate checks and searches. One company beganBritish government.
operations in the swamp about December 21,In popular Malaysian culture, the Emergency has
1954. On January 9, 1955, full-scale tacticalfrequently been portrayed as a primarily Malay
operations began; artillery, mortars and aircraftstruggle against the communists. However, this
began harassing fires in the South Swamp.perception has been criticised by some, such as
Originally, the plan was to bomb and shell theInformation Minister Zainuddin Maidin, for not
swamp day and night so that the terrorists (sic)recognising Chinese and Indian efforts.
would be driven out into ambushes; but theCultural developments during the Emergency
terrorists were well prepared to stay indefinitely.And the Rain My Drink, a novel by Han Suyin set
Food parties came out occasionally, but the civilin this period.
population was too afraid to report them.Songs
Plans were modified; harassing fires were reducedDarah Rakyat
to night-time only. Ambushes continued andBendera Tentera
patrolling inside the swamp was intensified.Ganyang Malaysia
Operations of this nature continued for threeIndonesia Merdeka
months without results. Finally on March 21, anSee also
ambush party, after forty-five hours of waiting,British military history
succeeded in killing two of eight terrorists. TheFar East Strategic Reserve
first two red pins, signifying kills, appeared on theCommunist Insurgency War (Second Malayan
operations map, and local morale rose a little.Emergency)
Another month passed before it was learned thatFurther reading
the terrorists were making a contact inside theComber, Leon (2003). "The Malayan Security
swamp. One platoon established an ambush; oneService (19451948)". Intelligence and National
terrorist appeared and was killed. May passedSecurity, Volume 18, Issue 3. pp. 128153. 
without a contact. In June, a chance meeting by aComber, Leon (February, 2006). "The Malayan
patrol accounted for one killed and one captured.Special Branch on the Malayan-Thai Frontier during
A few days later, after four fruitless days ofthe Malayan Emergency". Intelligence and National
patrolling, one platoon en route to campSecurity, Volume 21, Issue 1. pp. 7799. 
accounted for two more terrorists. The No. 3Comber, Leon (2006). "Malaya's Secret Police
terrorist in the area surrendered and stated that194560. The Role of the Special Branch in the
food control was so effective that one terroristMalayan Emergency". PhD dissertation, Monash
had been murdered in a quarrel over food.University. ISEAS (Institute of SE Asian Affairs,
On July 7, two additional companies were assignedSingapore) and MAI (Monash Asia Institute). 
to the area; patrolling and harassing fires wereHack, Karl (1999). "Corpses, Prisoners of War and
intensified. Three terrorists surrendered and oneCaptured documents: British and Communist
of them led a platoon patrol to the terroristNarratives of the Malayan Emergency, and the
leader's camp. The patrol attacked the camp,Dynamics of Intelligence Transformation".
killing four, including the leader. Other patrolsIntelligence and National Security. 
accounted for four more; by the end of July,Hack, Karl; Chin, C.C (2004). Dialogues with Chin
twenty-three terrorists remained in the swampPeng: New Light on the Malayan Communist
with no food or communications with the outsideParty. 
world ...Jumper, Roy (2001). Death Waits in the Dark: The
This was the nature of operations: 60,000 artillerySenoi Praaq, Malaysia's Killer Elite. Greenwood
shells, 30,000 rounds of mortar ammunition, andPress. ISBN 0-313-31515-9. 
2,000 aircraft bombs for 35 terrorists killed orNagl, John A (2002). Learning to Eat Soup With a
captured. Each one represented 1,500 man-daysKnife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya
of patrolling or waiting in ambushes. "Nassau" wasand Vietnam. University of Chicago. ISBN
considered a success for the end of the0226-56770-2. 
emergency was one step nearer.Stubbs, Richard (2004). Hearts and Minds in
Resolving the EmergencyGuerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency
History of Malaysia19481960. Eastern University. ISBN 981210352X. 
Prehistoric MalaysiaTaber, Robert (2002). War of the flea: the classic
Early kingdomsstudy of guerrilla warfare. Brassey's. ISBN
Gangga Negara (2nd11th)9781574885552. 
Langkasuka (2nd14th)References
Pan Pan (3rd5th)^ Mohamed Amin and Malcolm Caldwell (eds.), The
Srivijaya (7th13th)Making of a Neo Colony, (1977), Spokesman
Kedah Kingdom (630-1136)Books, UK, footnote, p. 216.
The rise of Muslim states^ Andaya, Barbara Watson; Leonard Y. Andaya
Kedah Sultanate (1136resent)(2001). A History of Malaysia. Palgrave. p. 271. 
Malacca Sultanate (14021511)^ Rashid, Rehman (1993). A Malaysian Journey.
Sulu Sultanate (14501899)p. 27. ISBN 983-99819-1-9. 
Johor Sultanate (1528resent)^ Karl Hack, Defense & Decolonization in
European colonialismSouth-East Asia, p. 113.
Portuguese Malacca (1511-1641)^ Joel E. Hamby Civil-military operations: joint
Dutch Malacca (1641-1824)doctrine and the Malayan Emergency, Joint Force
Straits Settlements (18261946)Quarterly, Autumn, 2002, Paragraph 3,4
British Malaya (18741946)^ Peoples, Curtis. "The Use of the British Village
Federated Malay States (18951946)Resettlement Model in Malaya and Vietnam, 4th
Unfederated Malay States (19091946)Triennial Symposium (April 11-13, 2002), The
Kingdom of Sarawak (18411946)Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech
North Borneo (18821963)University"].
World War II^ Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya,
Japanese occupation (19411945)Director of Operations, Malaya, 1958, Chapter III:
Malaysia in transitionOwn Forces
Malayan Union (19461948)^ Nagl (2002), pp.67-70
Federation of Malaya (19481963)^ Taber, The War of the Flea, pp.140-141. Quote
Independence (1957)from Marine Corps Schools, "Small Unit
Federation of Malaysia (1963resent)Operations" in The Guerrilla - and how to Fight
Malaysia PortalHim
 v  d  e ^ Ongkili, James P. (1985). Nation-building in
On October 6, 1951 the MNLA ambushed andMalaysia 19461974. Oxford University Press.
killed the British High Commissioner, Sir Henryp. 79. ISBN 0-19-582681-7. 
Gurney. The killing has been described as a major^ my
factor in causing the Malayan population to roundly;resnum=2&ct=result#PPA295,M1".
reject the MNLA campaign, and also as leading to^ Memorandum from the Chief Minister and
widespread fear due to the perception that "ifMinister for Internal and Security, No. 386/17/56,
even the High Commissioner was no longer safe,30 April 1956. CO1030/30
there was little hope of protection and safety for^ a b Prof Madya Dr. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud,
the man-in-the-street in Malaya." More recently,Tunku Abdul Rahman and His Role in the Baling
MNLA leader Chin Peng stated that the killing hadTalks
little effect, and that the communists anyway^ MacGillivray to the the Secretary of State for
radically altered their strategy that month in theirthe Colonies, 15 March 1956, CO1030/22
"October Resolutions". The October Resolutions, a^ "
response to the Briggs Plan, involved a change of^ AWM.
tactics by reducing attacks on economic targets^ Comber (2006), Malaya's Secret Police 194560.
and civilians, increasing efforts to go into politicalThe Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan
organisation and subversion, and bolstering theEmergency
supply network from the Min Yuen as well as^ Clutterbuck, Richard (1967). The long long war:
jungle farming.The emergency in Malaya, 19481960. Cassell. 
Gurney's successor, Lieutenant General GeraldCited at length in Vietnam War essay on
Templer, was instructed by the BritishInsurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from
government to push for immediate measures toMalaya, eHistory, Ohio State University.
give Chinese ethnic residents the right to vote. He^ "Analysis of British tactics in Malaya" (PDF).
also pursued the Briggs Plan, and sped up the^ Kaur, Manjit (Dec. 16, 2006). Zam: Chinese too
formation of a Malayan army. At the same timefought against communists. The Star.
he made it clear that the Emergency itself wasExternal links
the main impediment to accelerating decolonisation.Australian War Memorial (Malayan Emergency
He also increased financial rewards for detecting19501960)
guerrillas by any civilians and expanded theFar East Strategic Reserve Navy Association
intelligence network (Special Branch).(Australia) Inc. (Origins of the FESR Navy)
Government's Declaration of AmnestyMalayan Emergency (AUS/NZ Overview)
On September 8, 1955, the Government of theBritain's Small Wars (Malayan Emergency)
Federation of Malaya issued a declaration ofPsyWar.
amnesty to the Communists. The Government of